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Firm- and country-level antecedents of corporate governance compliance and disclosure 
in MENA countries 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose – This paper investigates the level of compliance with, and disclosure of, corporate 
governance best practice recommendations, and the firm- and country-level factors that can 
explain discernible differences in the level of compliance with, and disclosure of, corporate 
governance best practice recommendations in a number of Middle Eastern and North African 
(MENA) countries. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – We use the widely employed content analysis technique to 
examine the level of compliance with, and disclosure of, corporate governance best practice 
recommendations in a sample of listed corporations in MENA countries. In addition, we 
employ the ordinary least square multiple regression analysis technique to examine the firm- 
and country-level antecedents of the level of compliance with, and disclosure of, corporate 
governance best practice recommendations. The findings are generally robust to different types 
of firm- and country-level factors, alternative measures and potential endogeneity problems. 
 
Findings – The findings of this study are two-fold. First, the level of voluntary compliance 
with, and disclosure of, corporate governance best practice recommendations among MENA 
listed corporations is low and differs substantially across firms. Second, our evidence suggests 
that firm- and country-level factors, including religiosity, national governance quality and 
macroeconomic factors have a positive and significant impact on voluntary compliance with, 
and disclosure of, corporate governance best practice recommendations. 
 
Originality/value – To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to examine both the 
potential firm- and country-level factors affecting voluntary compliance with, and disclosure 
of, corporate governance best practice recommendations among MENA listed corporations 
within a neo-institutional theoretical perspective. The results of our study provide regulators 
and policy-makers with the impetus to encourage greater efforts towards pursuing reforms that 
seek to improve national governance quality, economic environment and positive religious 
practices.   
 
Keywords Corporate governance disclosure, Firm and national governance quality, 
Religiosity, Macroeconomic factors, MENA countries, Neo-institutional theory    
 
Paper type Research paper 
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Introduction 
This study departs from much of the existing accounting, corporate governance (CG), 
disclosure and transparency literature by investigating the level of compliance with, and 
disclosure of, CG best practice recommendations in MENA countries, and the extent to which 
firm- and country-level factors, including religiosity, national governance quality and 
macroeconomic factors can explain noticeable variations in the level of compliance with, and 
disclosure of, CG best practice recommendations. The analysis and interpretations of the 
findings draw inspiration from neo-institutional theory.       
There is increasing global interest in developing the level of compliance with, and 
disclosure of, sound CG practices (Ntim et al., 2012b; Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Elmagrhi et al., 
2016; Elamer et al., 2018). Discernibly, MENA countries have pursued economic and financial 
reforms aimed at encouraging domestic savings and attracting foreign investment (Lagoarde-
Segot and Lucey, 2008; Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Aljifri et al., 2014). One way of achieving this 
objective is to improve the disclosure environment and governance practices (Al-Shammari 
and Al-Sultan, 2010; Baydoun et al., 2012; Aljifri et al., 2014; Albitar, 2015). Although 
previous studies have used a number of theories, including agency, legitimacy, resource 
dependence and stakeholder to examine the possible motives that may explain why public 
corporations comply with, and disclose, sound CG practices (Samaha et al., 2012; Al-Janadi et 
al., 2013; Aljifri et al., 2014; Al-Bassam et al., 2018), the recent discernible growth in the 
issuance and/or adoption of CG codes can arguably also be explained within the context of 
neo-institutional theory (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004, 
2009; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012; Judge et al., 2008; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008; Kim, 2016; 
Shahab et al., 2018).  
Neo-institutional theory predicts that the prevalence of many business norms and 
practices among firms or countries is influenced by institutional aspects (e.g., economic, social 
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and political forces) (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 1991; Scott, 2001). Different members of 
society (e.g., corporations and nations) are subject to institutional forces, which may be driven 
by the need to pursue economic efficiency (substantive management) and/or social legitimacy 
(symbolic management) (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). In 
this case, prior studies have successfully used neo-institutional theory at the national level to 
rationalise institutional forces, which may drive or hinder the diffusion of several corporate 
practices. These include International Accounting Standards (IASs) (Judge et al., 2010, Kim, 
2016) and governance codes and mechanisms (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Judge et al., 2008; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). Neo-institutional theory 
has also been used recently to explain company practices, such as corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) (e.g., Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a, b; Bose 
et al., 2017; Haque and Ntim, 2018) and the adoption of voluntary CG compliance and 
disclosure practices (Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Alnabsha et al., 2018).  
Consistent with global developments, MENA countries have pursued CG reforms by 
issuing national CG codes. Similar to most emerging economies, MENA CG codes mostly 
adopt a UK-style voluntary “comply or explain” compliance and disclosure regime (Elghuweel 
et al., 2017; Al-Bassam et al., 2018). However and distinct from most developed countries, 
MENA context has distinctive cultural features of having strong hierarchical social structure, 
where greater importance is usually attached to religious and informal relationships, such as 
family loyalty, norms, and tribalism than formal CG and accountability mechanisms like 
corporate boards and institutional shareholdings (Elghuweel et al., 2017; Al-Bassam et al., 
2018).  Arguably, these contextual challenges raise serious empirical questions as to whether 
institutional factors (i.e., religiosity, national governance quality and macroeconomic factors) 
that are prevalent in MENA economies can hinder or improve CG standards in their listed 
corporations (Samaha et al., 2012; Al-Bassam et al., 2018). Compared to previous cross-
5 
 
country studies that have based their argument on national-level institutional differences 
between the “Anglo-American” and the “Continental” CG models (Aguilera and Jackson, 
2003; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012), the current study introduces new evidence by examining 
the impact of institutional factors on the level of compliance with, and disclosure of, CG best 
practice recommendations within MENA context that is rarely studied in the literature. The 
current study also focuses on both firm- and country-level factors that may explain observable 
differences in the level of compliance with, and disclosure of, CG best practice 
recommendations within MENA countries. By contrast, much of the previous studies that have 
addressed similar questions have either focused on firm-level factors (Ntim et al., 2012a; 
Samaha et al., 2012; Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Al-Bassam and Ntim, 2017; Al-Bassam et al., 2018) 
or country-level factors (Salter, 1998; Jaggi and Low, 2000; Zaman Mir et al., 2009) only. 
Therefore, the current study responds directly to recent calls for studies that explore both firm- 
and country-level determinants by examining whether discernible variations in the level of 
compliance with, and disclosure of, CG best practice recommendations may be explained by 
noticeable differences in firm- and country-level institutions with specific focus on MENA 
countries (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Archambault and Archambault, 2003).                
Although religion is often considered to be one of the main institutional and cultural 
pillars that may affect corporate activities (Archambault and Archambault, 2003; Aribi and 
Gao, 2011; Baydoun et al., 2012; Chan-Serafin et al., 2013; Du et al., 2016), few studies have 
examined the effect of religiosity on modern organisations’ outcomes and decisions, including 
CG disclosures (Baydoun et al., 2012; Tracey, 2012; Chan-Serafin et al., 2013; Du et al., 2016). 
It is, however, discernible that a large number of such previous studies (Al-Shammari and Al-
Sultan, 2010; Samaha et al., 2012; Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Al-Bassam et al., 2018) have mainly 
examined the effect of firm-level characteristics and CG measures on corporate voluntary 
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disclosure, notably ignoring the impact of religiosity, national governance quality and 
macroeconomic factors.  
 Consequently, the current study aims to extend existing knowledge by offering a 
number of new contributions to the existing literature. First, it seeks to add to the extant 
literature by providing new cross-country evidence on the level of compliance with, and 
disclosure of, CG best practice recommendations in MENA countries. Second, it examines how 
religiosity affects the levels of compliance with, and disclosure of, CG best practice 
recommendations. Third, it provides new evidence on the extent to which the quality of 
national governance affects the level of compliance with, and disclosure of, CG best practice 
recommendations. Finally, it offers a new evidence on the effect of macroeconomic factors on 
the level of compliance with, and disclosure of, CG best practice recommendations among 
listed firms in MENA countries. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, we briefly discuss recent 
governance reforms and practices in MENA countries. Second, we present the theoretical 
framework and then followed by the literature review and development of hypotheses section. 
Third, we discuss the research design. Fourth, we present the empirical analysis, including 
robustness checks; and finally, we outline our study’s limitations and concluding remarks.       
 
Governance reforms and practices in MENA countries   
MENA countries provide an interesting context to conduct the current study for a number of 
reasons. First, most of these countries have many common cultural aspects (e.g., they speak 
Arabic, follow Islam, and share many customs and traditions). These distinctive characteristics 
have direct effects on their economic features, information environment and corporate practices 
(Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010; Baydoun et al., 2012; Al-Bassam and Ntim, 2017; 
Elghuweel et al., 2017; Al-Bassam et al., 2018). They also provide opportunities for 
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standardisation, harmonisation and convergence of governance codes and practices at both 
firm- and country-levels (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). Second, almost all MENA 
countries are emerging markets, with a stronger need to develop their investment environment, 
especially stock markets. Therefore, they have pursued economic and financial reforms in order 
to attract foreign direct investments (Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey, 2008; Baydoun et al., 2012; 
Aljifri et al., 2014). The issuance and implementation of CG codes in these countries are, 
therefore, essential for their economic success (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). Thus, the 
findings of this study may have important implications not just for MENA countries, but also 
for other developing countries and emerging markets, which have pursued governance reforms. 
Third, the MENA context is characterised by strong Islamic beliefs that are expected to 
have important effects on the adoption and implementation of good governance standards. It is 
argued that societies with strong religious principles are more likely to exhibit higher levels of 
transparency and compliance with regulations (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Al-Bassam and Ntim, 
2017; Elghuweel et al., 2017). Typically, within the MENA region, individuals appear to rely 
mainly on religious norms in monitoring business activities (Kamla, 2009). Unlike most 
previous studies, which were conducted in western contexts, where business is arguably not 
explicitly influenced heavily by religious tenets, the current study is conducted in MENA 
countries, where Sharia Law significantly influences business.  
Fourth, unlike developed countries, where strong legal enforcement affects corporate 
practices, emerging economies, including MENA countries have a record of weak legal 
enforcement, meaning that firms operating in these countries have little incentive to comply 
with corporate regulations (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Allen et al., 2005; Al-Bassam et al., 
2018). Consequently, this study seeks to examine the firm- and country-level determinants of 
compliance with, and disclosure of, CG best practice recommendations in this distinctive 
context. 
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A Neo-institutional framework for good governance practices 
Institutional theory argues that over time organisations tend to become structured, and 
influenced by social norms, symbols, beliefs and rituals (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Institutional theory, thus, studies the interaction between the organisation and the environment 
in which it operates.  
From the neo-institutional perspective, there are three types of institutional pressures: 
(i) coercive/regulative; (ii) cognitive/mimetic; and (iii) normative. These pressures can be 
combined to rationalise the diffusion of good governance practices at the company- or national-
levels. Briefly, coercive forces indicate that companies have to adhere to governmental or other 
equivalent regulations, such as capital markets. Memetic forces suggest that organisations may 
follow the steps of those, which are successful in their field. Normative forces indicate that in 
order to gain investors’ confidence, organisations may voluntarily follow conventional 
practices and norms (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009). Therefore, institutional theory predicts 
that organisational practices tend to become isomorphic over time due to these three types of 
pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 1991; Bose et al., 2017). 
The current study aims to apply this version of neo-institutional theory, which 
incorporates both efficiency and legitimation motives (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a, b; 
Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Kim, 2016) to explain differences in voluntary CG disclosure practices 
at the organisational-level. First, from a legitimation perspective, corporations can improve 
their legitimacy and social acceptance by adhering to the regulative institutional pressures to 
conform to expected social behaviours and international standards (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; 
Suchman, 1995). Therefore, they can gain organisational legitimacy by showing compliance 
with good governance practices in the form of increased governance disclosure. This facilitates 
the congruence of corporate goals and norms with those of the larger society. Similarly, 
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economic units can maintain good links with corporate stakeholders in order to improve 
corporate legitimacy by being involved in or mimicking accepted social behaviour (Aguilera 
et al., 2007). On the other hand, the theoretical implications of the efficiency (instrumental) 
view of neo-institutional theory argue that adhering to coercive, mimetic and normative 
institutional forces can help economic entities to gain critical resources in order to enhance 
corporate performance and the overall interests of shareholders (Aguilera et al., 2007).  
 
Governance and voluntary disclosure: Literature review and hypotheses development 
Some studies have examined a number of antecedents that can explain differences in the extent 
of voluntary disclosure of good governance practices at the firm-level (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 
2005; Ntim et al., 2012b; Samaha et al., 2012; Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Al-Bassam et al., 2018). 
Our study extends the literature on possible antecedents of CG compliance and disclosure. In 
particular, this study uses the neo-institutional theory to investigate the impact of firm- and 
country-level factors, including religiosity, national governance quality and macroeconomic 
factors on the level of compliance with, and disclosure of, CG best practice recommendations 
in MENA countries listed firms.  
 
Religiosity  
Institutional factors may better explain governance practices than do firm-level factors (Judge 
et al., 2008, 2010; Baydoun et al., 2012; Du et al., 2016; Bose et al., 2017). Therefore, this 
study will employ both firm- and country-level factors to examine the level of compliance with, 
and disclosure of, CG best practice recommendations in MENA countries. Starting with 
religiosity, although religion is considered to be one of the main institutional and cultural pillars 
that may affect corporate activities (Archambault and Archambault, 2003; Aribi and Gao, 
2011; Baydoun et al., 2012; Chan-Serafin et al., 2013; Elghuweel et al., 2017), few scholars 
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have investigated its impact on modern organisations’ outcomes and decisions, including 
governance disclosure (Tracey, 2012; Chan-Serafin et al., 2013). 
Contrary to most developed countries, where religion is often considered as a private 
matter (Rice, 1999), in most Muslim countries, Islam influences people’s daily activities and 
business, as it is integrated in all aspects of societal activities, including politics, community, 
law and economy (Hassan and Christopher, 2005; Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Kamla, 2009; Aribi 
and Gao, 2010). Therefore, business, financial and all economic transactions are performed 
within the tenets of Islamic principles. Governance of public corporations is also strongly 
influenced by Islamic values that emanate mainly from Sharia (Safieddine, 2009; Judge, 2010). 
Muslims believe that resources are provided to an individual by God in the form of trust, and 
therefore accountability is ultimately to God (Bhatti and Bhatti, 2010). The “umma” or society 
also has the right to know about the operations and transactions of business organisations 
(Lewis, 2006). Therefore, Islamic economic principles require business organisations to 
provide accurate and fair corporate disclosure to different users of their annual reports, so that 
they can make informed economic decisions (Maali et al., 2006; Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009). 
Likewise, the Islamic ideals of unity of purpose of life, universal brotherhood and trust suggest 
that organisations should show greater transparency/disclosure (Sulaiman and Willett, 2003) 
and apply sound governance practices in their business dealings (Hassan and Christopher, 
2005). Hassan and Christopher (2005) and Maali et al. (2006) proposed that in Muslim 
societies, organisations can use annual reports as a medium for promoting Islamic values 
(compliance with Islamic Sharia, “zakah”, fairness and justice – vis-à-vis sound governance 
practices and disclosure). Accordingly, higher religious institutions are expected to disclose 
relevant corporate information to gain legitimacy for their continued existence (Haniffa, 2001; 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, 2005; Maali et al., 2006; Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Farook et al., 2011; 
Tracey, 2012).  
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The existing theoretical frameworks rarely recognise religion as a foundation for 
explaining why organisations comply with and voluntarily disclose governance information 
(Haniffa, 2001; Aribi and Gao, 2011; Du et al., 2016). This is reflected in the dearth of literature 
investigating the impact of religion on governance practices. In this case and comparing the 
annual reports of 21 conventional financial institutions (CFIs) and 21 Islamic financial 
institutions (IFIs) operating in the Gulf region, Aribi and Gao (2010) find significant 
differences in the level of CSR disclosure between IFIs and CFIs. Using a sample of 761 
industrial companies from 37 countries, Archambault and Archambault (2003) find empirical 
evidence supporting the positive and significant effect of religion (Islamic, Catholic, Protestant 
and Buddhist) on corporate financial disclosure. Similarly, Ongena and Sendeniz-Yuncu 
(2011) find empirical evidence that Islamic banks mainly deal with firms that are more 
transparent in their disclosure behaviour, using 16,056 bank relationships from 1999 to 2008 
in Turkey. Further, Farook et al. (2011) document that Islamic governance (i.e., characteristics 
of the Sharia supervisory board) has a positive effect on the level of voluntary disclosure by 
Islamic banks. Additionally and using a sample of 75 Saudi listed firms from 2004 to 2010, 
Al-Bassam and Ntim (2017) report that corporations that depict greater commitment towards 
incorporating Islamic values into their operations engage in higher voluntary CG disclosures 
than those that do not. On the other hand, Hassan and Christopher (2005) investigated the 
impact of Islam on governance disclosure in the annual reports of Malaysian banks. They find 
that Islamic banks do not exhibit better governance practices and disclosure behaviour than 
conventional banks. Maali et al. (2006) also suggest that social reporting is not a major concern 
for most Islamic banks, although banks required to pay “zakah” do offer more social 
disclosures. Thus, based on these arguments, the first hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive association between religiosity and the level of compliance 
with, and disclosure of, CG best practice recommendations.  
12 
 
 
National governance quality 
National governance qualities, including laws and regulations are also an important 
determinant of organisational outcomes (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012). Available data from 
international organisations, such as the World Bank Group and Transparency International, 
demonstrates that, compared to the rest of the world, MENA countries are generally 
characterised by poor governance indicators. This is supported by the often relatively high 
levels of corruption, political instability, poor regulatory quality, lack of accountability, and 
general ineffectiveness of government institutions across several MENA countries (Bishara, 
2011; Heidenhof, 2014; Tunyi and Ntim, 2016). Even though governance indicators in the 
MENA region show some improvement since the Arab Spring, they are still weak compared 
to the rest of the world (Bishara, 2011; Heidenhof, 2014). This part of the world encounters a 
number of governance challenges that include: “the very high concentration of political and 
economic power by the governing elites and those close to them, a general lack of transparency 
and accountability of state actors and deeply felt feelings of a lack of dignity, social justice and 
inequality by the populace at large” (Heidenhof, 2014:2). 
 Empirical studies examining the effect of national governance quality on disclosure are 
generally rare, and therefore offers opportunity to contribute to the literature. Ioannou and 
Serafeim (2012) and Baldini et al. (2016) find that a high level of corruption has a significant 
negative impact on the level of environmental, social and governance disclosures. Similarly, 
Mateescu (2015) investigated firm- and country-level factors affecting CG disclosure practices. 
Using a sample of 51 companies listed in four emerging European countries (Estonia, Poland, 
Hungary and Romania), he reports a significant positive impact of the country-level variables 
(rule of law, government effectiveness and regulatory quality) on corporate compliance with, 
and disclosure of, CG practices. Also, using 401 firms from six countries, Jaggi and Low (2000) 
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find empirical evidence that firms from common law countries with widely dispersed 
ownership and a high level of debt financing are associated with higher financial disclosures, 
compared to firms from code law countries. Ioannou and Serafeim (2012), report that the 
political, labour, educational and cultural systems have a significant effect on corporate social 
performance. Further, in a cross-country study (examining data from 55 countries), Belkaoui 
(1983) finds no significant relationship between political freedom and corporate disclosure, 
although Goodrich (1986) finds a link between political systems and accounting clusters.  
Consequently, given the insights of the neo-institutional theory perspective, and 
following arguments from previous studies, the current study assumes that the quality of 
national governance is a significant structural factor influencing CG compliance and 
disclosure. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive association between the quality of national governance and 
the level of compliance with, and disclosure of, CG best practice recommendations. 
 
Macroeconomic factors   
Macroeconomic factors may also explain variations in the level of compliance with, and 
disclosure of, CG best practice recommendations (Belkaoui, 1983; Doupnik and Salter, 1995; 
Salter, 1998; Archambault and Archambault, 2003; Zaman Mir et al., 2009; Baydoun et al., 
2012). Corporate disclosure is influenced by national economic development (Salter, 1998; 
Archambault and Archambault, 2003). The theoretical evidence also proposes that firms need 
to raise more capital in countries with increasing economic development. Thus, they are likely 
to provide more corporate disclosure in order to reduce information asymmetry and mitigate 
agency costs (Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992; Salter, 1998). 
Developing countries are subject to external coercive pressures toward the adoption of 
best practices (e.g., IFRS) as a result of the foreign aid provided by international organisations 
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(coercive pressure) (Hassan, 2008; Judge et al., 2010). This may result in improvement in 
organisational governance practices in order to gain legitimacy. Most MENA countries have 
experienced extensive neoliberal economic reforms and as such, has attracted significant 
foreign investments (Al-Bassam and Ntim, 2017; Md Zaini et al., 2018). Accordingly, 
domestic organisations may imitate successful multinational firms that originate from foreign 
locations with good governance practices (Wei et al., 2001; Judge et al., 2010). 
 Inflation is another institutional element that affects accounting practices, as it 
negatively impacts on the reliability of financial reports that are based on historical cost 
assumptions (Meek and Saudagaran, 1990; Archambault and Archambault, 2003). Therefore, 
firms operating in environments with high inflation are more likely to provide higher corporate 
disclosure in order to help investors to make informed decisions (Archambault and 
Archambault, 2003).  
In line with theoretical expectations, a number of previous studies have suggested that 
the average firm disclosure is higher in developed countries than in emerging markets (e.g., 
Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992; Salter, 1998; Archambault and Archambault, 2003; Md Zaini et 
al., 2018). For instance, Adhikari and Tondkar (1992) document that the level of disclosure 
requirements of 35 stock exchanges in different countries is positively related to the degree of 
economic development. Therefore, it is expected that there is a positive association between 
GDP and the extent of CG compliance and disclosure. Although theoretical evidence suggests 
a positive relationship between inflation and the level of CG compliance and disclosure, 
empirical evidence is mixed. For example, Doupnik and Salter (1995) find a positive link 
between inflation and disclosure among countries with a macroeconomic orientation. In 
contrast, using firm-level data from 33 countries, Archambault and Archambault (2003) report 
a negative relationship between inflation and corporate disclosure. Consistent with the existing 
theoretical and empirical evidence, our final hypothesis is that: 
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Hypothesis 3: There is a positive association between macroeconomic factors and the level of 
compliance with, and disclosure of, CG best practice recommendations. 
 
Research methodology  
Sample selection and data source 
Our sample is based on 494 non-financial and non-utility corporations listed on the national 
stock exchanges of Egypt, Jordan, Oman, Saudi Arabia and UAE (143, 121, 71, 112, and 47, 
respectively), with complete data over the period 2009 to 2014 [1].  Financial and utility firms 
are subject to different regulations and have different capital structure requirements that can 
impact differently on their disclosure and CG practices (Reverte, 2009; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 
2013). Consequently, companies in these industries are excluded from our final sample. We 
use the content analysis technique to measure CG attributes and CG disclosure by hand 
collecting data from the annual financial reports. Because traditional content analysis consumes 
a considerable amount of time and effort, we were able to collect data on 600 firm-year 
observations from 100 corporations employing the widely used stratified sampling technique 
based on firm size and industry in each country. The sampling period starts in 2009, because 
the 2007/2008 financial crisis increased debate surrounding the effectiveness of governance 
and disclosure practices (Elmagrhi et al., 2016). It ends in 2014 because this was the latest year 
for which the annual reports of listed corporations were published at the start of the data 
collection. Thus, the current study uses a time-series and cross-sectional data. This panel data 
structure is characterised by its ability to provide more informative data, more reliability, less 
collinearity among variables, and more degrees of freedom (Gujarati, 2009; Wooldridge, 
2013). Data of board characteristics and ownership structures were manually collected from 
firms’ annual reports, their web sites, and capital markets websites of the respective sampled 
countries. Financial and accounting variables were collected from Datastream database. 
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Finally, country-level data, including GDP and national governance quality were collected 
from the website of the World Bank. Further, the global Islamic economy indicator was 
collected from Thomson Reuter’s website, whilst inflation rate was collected from the 
International Monetary Fund’s website. 
 
Model specification and variables measurement  
The study’s variables are classified into three main categories, as fully explained in the 
Appendix and Table 1. First, our main dependent variable is the CG index (GIND). This index 
follows a checklist developed by the Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on 
International Standards of Accounting and Reporting (ISAR), organised by the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2006). This checklist (“UNCTAD ISAR 
benchmark”) of guidance on good practices on CG disclosure was based on five sections used 
to construct 5 sub-indices: (i) ownership structure and exercise of control rights (OSH); (ii) 
financial transparency (TCY); (iii) auditing (AUD); (iv) corporate responsibility and 
compliance (RTY); and (v) board and management structure and process (BMS). The GIND is 
constructed by awarding a value of ‘1’ if each of the 51 CG provisions contained in the 
Appendix is disclosed and ‘0’ otherwise. With this binary scoring scheme, a firm’s total 
disclosure score in a particular firm-year can vary between 0 (perfect non-compliance and non-
disclosure) and 100% (perfect compliance and disclosure) [2].  
The widely used content analysis technique of coding narratives into different themes 
and patterns was employed in collecting the CG data (Samaha et al., 2012; Elmagrhi et al., 
2016; Al-Bassam et al., 2018; Md Zaini et al., 2018). To ensure the reliability, validity and 
consistency of the coding process, we followed the following procedures. First, the annual 
reports of each firm from 2009 to 2014 (for an initial sample of 25 firms, consisting of 5 firms 
from each of the 5 sampled countries) were read in its entirety to ensure that companies were 
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not penalised for non-disclosure of non-applicable items. We discussed the coding categories 
and then coded the items with two experienced coders. After coding the annual reports of the 
initial sample, the second round of coding was conducted for the entire sample (600 firm-year 
observations). Any mistakes or inconsistencies identified independently by the two coders in 
the first round were discussed and corrected in the second round. After coding the annual 
reports of all the 600 firm-year observations, a third round was conducted as a final assessment. 
This third round was conducted in order to improve the coding accuracy by identifying and 
correcting any mistakes or inconsistencies made during the previous two rounds. The results 
of the third round were largely similar to those of the two previous rounds, indicating that 
stability among the different rounds of coding was attained. Furthermore, to measure the 
internal consistency of the GIND, Cronbach’s alpha test was conducted. The coefficient for the 
five sub-indices in the GIND is 0.713, indicating that the power of the empirical test is less 
likely to be affected by any random measurement error (Elmagrhi et al., 2016). 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 The second group of variables are independent variables that contain: (i) firm Islamic 
values index (FIVI); (ii) global Islamic economy indicator (GIEI) (religiosity); (iii) national 
governance quality (NGI) (national governance); (iv) GDP growth (GDP); and (v) inflation 
(INFL) (macroeconomic factors). In this case, we first focus on two key layers of religiosity 
(firm- and country-level). Firm-level Islamic religious values are measured using index that 
contains three provisions: (i) whether a narrative regarding the fact that the firm’s funds and 
loans are on the basis of interest-free is disclosed; (ii) whether the firm discloses any Islamic 
and conventional finance commitments separately; and (iii) whether a narrative regarding the 
appropriate calculation and payment of the Islamic religious tax “zakah” for the financial year 
is disclosed, that takes a value of ‘1’ if each of the provisions is disclosed, ‘0’ otherwise. 
Country-level Islamic religious values are measured using global Islamic economy indicator, 
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developed by Thomson Reuters in collaboration with the Dubai Islamic Economy 
Development Centre that measures the development of the global Islamic economy across its 
multiple sectors (Islamic finance, Halal food, Halal travel, Modest fashion, Halal media and 
recreation, and Halal pharmaceuticals and cosmetic). Second, we operationalise country-level 
governance quality by adopting country-level data compiled by Kaufmann et al. (2014), as part 
of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs) project. In the WGIs project, data from over 
30 different sources are combined into six aggregate governance indicators (voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption). We employ these six aggregate 
governance indicators (expressed in percentile rank terms) to measure the quality of national 
governance. Finally, we measure macroeconomic factors using country’s GDP growth and 
country’s inflation rate, as measured by the percent change in the average national consumer 
prices index. 
The final group measures are the control variables. These are: (i) firm-level governance 
variables, namely board size (BRDS), gender and ethnicity diversity within the board of 
directors (BDIV), unitary board leadership (UBL), director shareholding (DSHR) and block 
shareholding (BSHR); and (ii) firm-level characteristics, namely size (LNTA), age (AGE), 
growth opportunities (SGR), leverage (LV), profitability (ROA), audit firm size (AFSIZ), 
dummy variables for the years of operation (DYER), dummy variables for industries (DIND) 
and dummy variables for countries  (DCOU). 
 After validating all the assumptions of multivariate regressions, the following 
multivariate OLS regression model is used:  
)1(
1
543210 
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ititiitititititit CONTROLSINFLGDPNGIGIEIFIVIGIND   
Where GIND is the overall MENA countries’ CG index; FIVI is firm-level Islamic 
values index, GIEI is Global-level Islamic economy indicator; NGI is country-level 
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governance; GDP is a country’s GDP growth; and INFL is a country’s inflation rate, and 
CONTROLS refers to firm-level control variables, namely board size (BRDS), board diversity 
on the basis of both gender and ethnicity (BDIV), unitary board leadership (UBL), director 
shareholding (DSHR), block shareholding (BSHR), size (LNTA), age (AGE), growth 
opportunities (SGR), leverage (LV), profitability (ROA), audit firm size (AFSIZ), year dummies 
(DYER), industry dummies (DIND) and country dummies (DCOU).  
 
Empirical results  
Descriptive analysis 
Table 2 illustrates summary descriptive analysis of the main dependent, independent and 
control variables over the 6 years investigated (2009-2014). Panel ‘A’ of Table 2 shows 
descriptive statistics for the overall (GIND) index and its sub-indices. GIND index shows wide 
variability in its distribution. Specifically, it ranges from a minimum of 31.37% (16 out of 51) 
to a maximum of 84.31% (43 out of 51), with the average (median) firm complying with 56.45 
% (56.86%) of the 51 CG provisions examined. With regard to the GIND’s 5 sub-indices, they 
also show substantial differences in their descriptive analysis. For example, ownership 
structure and exercise of control rights (OSH) ranges from a minimum compliance rate of 
22.22% to a maximum of 100%, with the average firm complying with 63.31% of the 9 CG 
provisions investigated. Also, board and management structure and process (BMS) ranges from 
a minimum compliance rate of 22.22% to a maximum of 88.89%, with the average firm 
complying with 58.09% of the 18 CG provisions investigated. Thus, descriptive statistics 
indicate low level, and considerable variations in the level of compliance with, and disclosure 
of, both the overall GIND index and its 5 sub-indices. Noticeably, these findings are consistent 
with those of the extant CG disclosure literature in MENA countries (Samaha et al., 2012; Al 
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Janadi et al., 2013; Aljifri et al., 2014; Albitar, 2015; Al-Bassam et al., 2018; Md Zaini et al., 
2018).  
Insert Table 2 about here 
 The descriptive statistics for independent and control variables are illustrated in Panels 
‘B’ and ‘C’, respectively. With regard to the independent variable – firm Islamic values index 
(FIVI), for example, the findings show that the average (median) firm complied with 18.22% 
(0%) of the firm Islamic values index. In line with the findings of previous studies (e.g., Al-
Bassam and Ntim, 2017; Elghuweel et al., 2017), our results indicate that a low percentage of 
the sampled firms comply with Islamic values. Elghuweel et al., 2017 found that the average 
of Islamic governance committee presence in Omani listed firms was about 1.22%. The GIEI 
also shows wide variation, ranging from 27.15% to 67.51%, with 45.64% average country 
application of Islamic economic principles. Further, national governance quality (NGI) 
demonstrates a wide spread, spanning from a minimum of -473.28% to a maximum of 
357.26%. With regard to macroeconomic factors, sampled countries show a wide variance as 
well. For example, GDP (INFL) ranges from a minimum of -5.20% (110.50%) to a maximum 
of 10% (316.99%), with average 3.46% (179.70%).       
Control variables are illustrated in Panel ‘C’ of Table 2. The board size (BRDS) with a 
median of nine members is between a minimum of four and a maximum of 19 members. Board 
diversity (BDIV) on the basis of both gender and ethnic minority ranges from 0% to 69.23% 
with an average of 7.88%, which suggests that on average MENA listed firms’ boards are 
dominated by Arab males. All the other control variables show wide variation, suggesting that 
the sample is relatively representative of firms in MENA countries.  
 Table 3 presents the correlation matrix (including both Pearson’s parametric and 
Spearman’s non-parametric coefficients) for the variables to test for multicollinearity. The 
direction and magnitude of both coefficients are generally similar, hence suggesting that any 
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remaining non-normalities may not pose a serious statistical problem. Noticeably, the bivariate 
correlations among the variables are also averagely low, indicating that any remaining 
multicollinearity problems may not be harmful [3]. Interestingly and as expected, compliance 
with Islamic values at the firm- (FIVI) and country- (GIEI) levels, national governance (NGI), 
and GDP growth (GDP) have a statistically significant positive relationship with the MENA 
CG index (GIND). In addition, significant associations exist between the CG index (GIND) 
and the control measures employed, for example, size (LNTA), growth opportunities (SGR), 
leverage (LV), profitability (ROA) and audit firm size (AFSIZ). On the other hand, the 
correlation matrix shows that GIND has a negative significant correlation with unitary board 
leadership (UBL), director shareholding (DSHR) and age (AGE).  
Insert Table 3 about here 
Multivariate regression analysis 
Table 4 reports the findings of the regression results for the model investigating firm- and 
country-level antecedents of the level of disclosure of, and compliance with, CG best practice 
recommendations. Models 1 to 5 show the cross-sectional OLS regressions of religiosity, 
national governance quality and macroeconomic factors on CG index (GIND).  
Insert Table 4 about here 
 With regard to religiosity, Models 1, 2 and 5 show a positive and significant relationship 
between FIVI, GIEI and GIND, suggesting that H1 is empirically supported. This evidence is 
also consistent with the predictions of our neo-institutional theory framework. Specifically, the 
efficiency-led perspective suggests that firms complying with Islamic values are more likely 
to comply with, and disclose, CG best practice recommendations. This can attract additional 
resources by meeting Islamic finance providers’ demand for information about their 
investments. From the legitimisation perspective, firms practising Islamic values are more 
likely to voluntarily comply with and disclose CG best practice recommendations to improve 
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their reputation and image. This legitimises their operations through working within the 
framework of their society’s principles. Empirically, the results are in line with the finding of 
Al-Bassam and Ntim (2017), which indicates that Islamic values drive the extent to which 
Saudi listed firms voluntarily comply with and disclose CG provisions contained in the 2006 
Saudi code. Additionally, the current study’s results are in line with that of Ongena and 
Sendeniz-Yuncu (2011), which suggests that Islamic banks mainly deal with firms that are 
more transparent in their disclosure behaviour. The findings also support the empirical results 
of previous studies (e.g., Maali et al., 2006; Farook et al., 2011), which indicate that Islamic 
banks with effective Islamic governance (e.g., required to pay the Islamic religious tax 
“zakah”) provide more voluntary disclosures than those who do not adhere to Sharia. Similarly 
and at the country-level, results which are demonstrated in Model 2 suggest that firms listed in 
countries applying the Islamic economic model are more likely to comply with and disclose 
CG best practice recommendations than those that are not. Theoretically, this finding is 
consistent with the neo-institutional (efficiency and legitimation views) perspective. Business 
organisations in the Islamic world generally encounter unique agency relationships and CG 
challenges, requiring them to disclose more information in order to mitigate agency conflict in 
addition to help in gaining social legitimacy (Safieddine 2009; Al-Bassam and Ntim, 2017). 
Empirically, the results support previous studies, which have documented a positive impact of 
religiosity on the extent of corporate disclosure (e.g., Archambault and Archambault, 2003; 
Aribi and Gao, 2011). Economically, our findings imply that a one standard deviation change 
(increase) in FIVI and GIEI may be associated with about 1.51% (31.55% × 0.048) and 4.56% 
(13.34% × 0.342) change (increase) in the level of the GIND, respectively. 
Models 3 and 5 of Table 4 illustrate the results of the association between national 
governance quality (NGI) and CG index (GIND). Reported findings suggest that national 
governance quality is also positively related to compliance with, and disclosure of, CG best 
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practice recommendations. This is also consistent with the neo-institutional theory perspective, 
which suggests that firms operating in countries characterised by high-quality governance (i.e., 
political stability, government efficiency, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of 
corruption) are generally assumed to have a higher level of corporate disclosure. Since, 
countries with strong legal protection rights have widely dispersed ownership, more outside 
(minority) shareholding and a high level of debt finance, and therefore tend to have more 
agency conflicts, firms operating in such countries are likely to provide more detailed corporate 
disclosures in order to meet the demands of different groups of investors and creditors (Jaggi 
and Low, 2000; La Porta et al., 1997, 2000). The current results support H2 and are consistent 
with the empirical results provided by several authors (e.g., Judge et al., 2008; Ioannou and 
Serafeim, 2012; Mateescu, 2015; Baldini et al., 2016). Economically, the positive effect of NGI 
on GIND implies that on average improvements in national governance quality will be 
associated with improvements in the level of compliance with, and disclosure of, CG best 
practice recommendations. 
With regard to the third explanatory factors (macroeconomic factors), results reported 
in models 4 and 5 illustrate that economic development (GDP) and inflation (INFL) have a 
positive and significant impact on corporate compliance with, and disclosure of, CG best 
practice recommendations. This is largely consistent with the predictions of neo-institutional 
theory, which suggests that firms operating in more economically developed countries need to 
raise more capital, and thus, they are likely to provide more corporate disclosures in order to 
reduce information asymmetry and mitigate agency costs, as well as to legitimise their 
operations (Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992; Salter, 1998). Likewise, firms operating in 
environments with high inflation are more likely to provide higher corporate disclosures in 
order to help investors to make informed decisions (Archambault and Archambault, 2003). The 
current results support H3 and are consistent with the empirical results provided by previous 
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studies (e.g., Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992; Salter, 1998; Archambault and Archambault, 2003). 
The economic implications of our findings is that a one standard deviation change in GDP and 
INFL may be associated with about 0.84% (2.58% × 0.327) and 3.00% (59.92% × 0.050) 
change in the level of the GIND, respectively. 
The findings reported in Table 4, Models 1 to 5 indicate that board size (BRDS) and 
block shareholding (BSHR) have insignificant effect on the level of compliance with, and 
disclosure of, CG best practice recommendations, which is consistent with a number of 
previous studies (Samaha et al., 2012; Al-Bassam et al., 2018), but is inconsistent with other 
past evidence that reports a significant association (Ntim et al., 2012b; Elmagrhi et al., 2016). 
The positive board ethnicity and gender diversity (BDIV) – CG index (GIND) link is in line 
with the findings of Elmagrhi et al. (2016), Haniffa and Cook (2002, 2005), and Ntim and 
Soobaroyen (2013a). The negative connection between director shareholding (DSHR), unitary 
board leadership (UBL), and CG index (GIND) provides support for past voluntary disclosure 
evidence (Haniff and Cooke, 2002; Albitar, 2015) that suggests that director shareholding and 
unitary board leadership are negatively associated with the level of compliance with, and 
disclosure of, CG best practice recommendations.  
Observably, the other control variables also have significant relationships with the 
dependent variable (GIND), as expected. For example, size (LNTA), profitability (ROA) and 
audit firm size (AFSIZ) are positively related to CG index (GIND). These results support the 
findings of Belkaoui (1983), Ntim et al. (2012b), Al Janadi et al. (2013), Albitar (2015), 
Mateescu, (2015), and Elmagrhi et al., (2016). However, leverage (LV) and growth 
opportunities (SGR), have an insignificant impact on the GIND. The insignificant influence of 
these variables is in line with previous studies, which have found no association between these 
variables and voluntary disclosure (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Samaha et al., 2010; Ntim 
et al., 2012b; Aljifri et al., 2014; Albitar, 2015; Mateescu, 2015). Furthermore, the results 
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support the suggestion that young firms (AGE) are more likely to heighten the level of 
compliance with, and disclosure of, CG best practice recommendations to in order to gain 
market confidence by reducing uncertainty about their operations (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002).   
The main CG index used in this study (GIND) contains five sub-indices, namely 
ownership structure (OSH), financial transparency (TCY), auditing (AUD), corporate 
responsibility and compliance (RTY) and board and management structure and process (BMS). 
To infer the association between firm- and country-level religiosity, national governance 
quality, macroeconomic factors and the five sub-indices and to assess whether these relations 
differ from the overall GIND, Table 5, Models 1 to 5, shows the results of OLS regression of 
the explanatory and control variables on the five sub-indices. For example, the coefficients of 
firm Islamic values index (FIVI) remain statistically significant and positively associated with 
AUD, RTY and BMS sub-indices, but insignificantly associated with OSH and TCY sub-indices. 
Likewise, the coefficients of national governance index (NGI) have a significant and positive 
association with all the sub-indices except ownership structure (OSH).    
    Insert Table 5 about here 
Robustness check 
To ascertain the robustness of the study’s findings, five additional sensitivity tests have been 
carried out. First, we re-estimate Eq. (1) using alternative measures of explanatory variables, 
namely the average of the six national governance qualities (AVNGI) and the natural logarithm 
of GDP (in US$) (LNGDP) (Houqe and Monem, 2016). Results presented in Model 1 of Table 
6 indicate that our main inferences hold when replacing the NGI and GDP with AVNGI and 
LNGDP. Second and in relation to the 51 CG provisions making up the overall GIND, each 
provision is assigned equal weight in the overall GIND. However, the five sub-indices are 
inherently allocated different weights due to the existence of different numbers of provisions 
in each sub-index: ownership structure (OSH 17.6%) (i.e., nine CG provisions divided by 51), 
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financial transparency (TCY 15.7%) (i.e., eight CG provisions), auditing (AUD 17.6%) (i.e., 
nine CG provisions), corporate responsibility and compliance (RTY 13.7%) (i.e., seven CG 
provisions), and board and management structure and process (BMS 35.3%) (i.e., 18 CG 
provisions). Accordingly, an alternative index (W-GIND) is created in which each of the five 
sub-indices is assigned an equal weight of 20% to find out whether the results hold regardless 
of the weighting of the five sub-indices. Model 2 of Table 6 reports the results of the association 
between explanatory variables and weighted CG index (W-GIND). Generally, the results are 
consistent with those obtained using the non-weighted CG index (GIND) presented in Model 
5 of Table 4. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
Third and in line with the suggestions of Elmagrhi et al. (2016) and Ntim and 
Soobaroyen (2013a), one method of resolving possible endogeneity problems is to estimate a 
lagged form. We estimate a lagged CG index (GIND)–explanatory variables connection in 
order to resolve the existence of a potential simultaneous relationship between the dependent 
and independent variables. We do this by regressing the current year’s CG index (GIND) on 
the previous year’s firm Islamic values index (FIVI), national governance quality (NGI) and 
macroeconomic factors (GDP and INFL). The results presented in Model 3 of Table 6 show 
that in general our findings in Model 5 of Table 4 are largely robust to estimate a lagged Islamic 
values index, national governance quality and macroeconomic factors, and CG index 
regression model. 
Fourth, it has been suggested that compliance with, and disclosure of, CG best practice 
recommendations may be influenced by other firm-specific opportunities and difficulties 
(Henry, 2008). Therefore, a fixed-effects model was estimated to address potential unobserved 
firm-specific heterogeneities that the OLS regression model may fail to control for (Henry, 
2008; Ntim et al., 2012a; Elmagrhi et al., 2016). The estimated fixed-effects model is based on 
27 
 
the re-estimation of Model 5 in Table 4, by including 99 dummies to represent the 100 sampled 
firms. The results reported in Model 4 of Table 6 are essentially similar to those contained in 
Model 5 of Table 4. Finally, The results of prior studies indicate that the size of a firm tends to 
affect CG compliance and disclosure levels and can result in varying effects of firm- and 
country-level characteristics on such disclosures (Baldini et al., 2016; Elmagrhi et al., 2016), 
and therefore we partition our sample across the median size. Results for the subsample of large 
firms (Model 6 of Table 6) show that firm Islamic values index (FIVI), national governance 
quality (NGI) and macroeconomic factors (GDP and INFL) are still correlated with CG index 
compared with the results of the subsample of small firms (Model 5 of Table 6). This evidence 
is also consistent with the theoretical predictions of our neo-institutional theoretical framework. 
The efficiency-led and legitimisation perspectives of neo-institutional theory suggest that large 
firms are more likely to comply with, and disclose, CG best practice recommendations in order 
to attract additional resources compared to small firms. 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
MENA countries have engaged recently in extensive economic and financial reforms 
(including, issuing CG codes) with the objective of attracting more private and foreign 
investment. However, the literature examining the level of compliance with, and disclosure of, 
CG best practice recommendations are still rare. Consequently, drawing on insights from neo-
institutional theory, this study investigates the extent of compliance with, and disclosure of, 
CG best practice recommendations among corporations listed in MENA countries.  
In addition to employing neo-institutional theory in interpreting the study’s findings, 
the authors provide a number of new contributions to the extant literature. First, analysis of the 
level of voluntary compliance with, and disclosure of, CG best practice recommendations 
indicates that CG practices among MENA listed firms are low and vary considerably. Second, 
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our evidence suggests that religiosity (firm- and country-level), national governance quality 
and macroeconomic factors have a positive and significant impact on voluntary compliance 
with, and disclosure of, CG best practice recommendations. Furthermore, our findings provide 
substantial theoretical and empirical insights for future research. With regard to theoretical 
extensions, future studies can improve their theoretical evidence by employing different CG 
theories (e.g., political cost theory, resource independence theory and transaction cost theory). 
In terms of empirical improvements, future studies can examine different sets of CG practices, 
such as external CG mechanisms (e.g., government regulations, media exposure, market 
competition and takeover activities).  
Our findings have important implications for regulators, policy-makers and 
corporations in developing countries and emerging markets intending to pursue CG reforms. 
For example, the significant extent of differences among MENA listed corporations in the level 
of compliance with CG best practice recommendations suggests that a lack of legislative 
enforcement that would result in most listed corporations in these countries not adhering to 
disclosure and transparency requirements. Thus, this suggests a need for the regulatory 
authorities and policy-makers to further enhance CG compliance and enforcement. This can be 
attained by strengthening legislative enforcement and establishing a “compliance and 
enforcement” unit that will continuously observe the implementation of CG practices. 
Furthermore, as the religiosity, national governance quality and macroeconomics factors are 
demonstrated to have a positive effect on corporate compliance with, and disclosure of, CG 
best practice recommendations, this provides regulators and policy-makers with the impetus to 
encourage greater efforts towards pursuing reforms that seek to improve national governance 
quality, economic environment and positive religious practices. In addition, although we find 
low level of voluntary compliance with Islamic values in the sampled firms, our results suggest 
that firms with a strong commitment to religious values, disclose more voluntary information 
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(CG disclosure) and hence companies are encouraged to adhere to Islamic business values and 
practices that may help enhance corporate transparency and disclosure. A prominent way by 
which MENA corporate boards’ decision-making process can be guided by Islamic religious 
beliefs and values is through the establishment of the Islamic governance committee in the 
form of the Sharia supervisory board. Sharia supervisory board should be able to offer guidance 
as to whether corporate investments, operations and activities are in lines with rules, beliefs, 
tenets and values of Islamic Sharia law. 
Although our findings are generally robust across a number of econometric models, 
there are some limitations that need to be acknowledged explicitly. First, future studies may 
improve on the generalisability of our findings by using a much larger sample of firms from 
MENA countries. Second, our study investigates the impact of a limited set of firm-level CG 
mechanisms (religiosity) and country-level (religiosity, national governance quality and 
macroeconomic factors) on the level of compliance with, and disclosure of, CG best practice 
recommendations. Future studies can examine the impact of other sets of CG mechanisms, 
such as board of directors’ efficiency, existence and characteristics of the audit committee 
along with other external CG characteristics and county-level cultural factors on the level of 
compliance with, and disclosure of, CG best practice recommendations. Finally and similar to 
all quantitative studies of this kind, our proxies for CG compliance and disclosure, national 
governance, religiosity and macroeconomic variables may or may not reflect practice. Future 
studies may, therefore, offer new insights by conducting in-depth interviews with company 
directors, executives, policy-makers and regulatory authorities regarding these issues. 
 
Notes 
1. The selected countries share a number of common characteristics: (i) they all have similar accounting, 
auditing, governance and legal systems, which are derived from the Anglo–Saxon system; (ii) they 
require listed firms to prepare their financial statements in accordance with International Accounting 
Standards or national accounting standards that have been developed in accordance with the 
International Accounting Standards; and (iii) they have similar cultural characteristics (e.g., a strong 
hierarchical social structure, importance of personal relationships, religion, accountability and trust), 
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corporate law, and ownership structures (concentrated shareholding dominated by the state and powerful 
families); thereby permitting comparability of governance and corporate reporting practices among 
firms and across countries. 
2. The rationale for choosing this un-weighted scheme in our study is for the following reasons. First, there 
is lack of a rigorously developed theoretical basis on which weights could be uniformly applied to the 
various CG disclosure practices (Black et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2013; Ntim, 2016). Second, it is easier 
to replicate an un-weighted index as the scoring scheme is more objective and transparent to implement 
(Beiner et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2017). Third, using an un-weighted coding scheme for scoring CG 
disclosure practices in annual reports can make it easier to make direct comparisons with the findings 
of prior studies (Archambault and Archambault, 2003; Henry, 2008; Ntim et al., 2012a; Samaha et al., 
2012; Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Al-Bassam et al., 2018). Finally, the evidence provided by previous 
literature indicates that similar results tend to be obtained from employing either weighted or un-
weighted indices, especially in cases, where the number of disclosure items is relatively large (Ntim et 
al. 2012 a, b; Soobaroyen and Ntim, 2013; Elmagrhi et al., 2016). This is empirically supported in our 
study (i.e., Model 2 of Table 6), as we find that both schemes (i.e., using weighted or un-weighted index) 
lead to similar results.    
3. The relatively high multicollinearity between GIEI and NGI (see Table 3) may affect the use of the OLS 
regression model. Therefore, GIEI was excluded from the OLS regression model in Model 5 of Table 
4.            
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Appendix. Full list of the UNCTAD ISAR corporate governance disclosure benchmark provisions (GIND) 
GIND Theme Disclosure Item Range 
of 
scores 
Total 
score per 
item 
(i) Ownership 
structure and 
exercise of 
control rights 
1. Ownership structure 0-1  
 
 
 
9 
2. Process for holding annual general meetings 0-1 
3. Changes in shareholdings 0-1 
4. Control structure 0-1 
5. Control and corresponding equity stake 0-1 
6. Availability and accessibility of meeting agenda 0-1 
7. Control rights 0-1 
8. Rules and procedures governing the acquisition of corporate control in capital markets 0-1 
9. Anti-takeover measures 0-1 
(ii) Financial 
transparency 
10. Financial and operating results 0-1  
 
 
8 
11. Critical accounting estimates 0-1 
12. Nature, type and elements of related-party transactions 0-1 
13. Company objectives 0-1 
14. Impact of alternative accounting decisions 0-1 
15. The decision-making process for approving transactions with related parties 0-1 
16. Rules and procedures governing extraordinary transactions 0-1 
17. Board's responsibilities regarding financial communications 0-1 
(iii) Auditing 18. Process for interaction with internal auditors 0-1  
 
 
 
9 
19. Process for interaction with external auditors 0-1 
20. Process for appointment of external auditors 0-1 
21. Process for appointment of internal auditors/scope of work and responsibilities 0-1 
22. Board confidence in independence and integrity of external auditors 0-1 
23. Internal control systems 0-1 
24. Duration of current auditors 0-1 
25. Rotation of audit partners 0-1 
26. Auditors` involvement in non-audit work and the fees paid to the auditors 0-1 
(iv) Corporate 
responsibility 
and 
compliance 
27. Policy and performance in connection with environmental and social responsibility 0-1  
 
 
7 
28. Impact of environmental and social responsibility policies on the firm’s sustainability 0-1 
29. A code of ethics for the board and waivers to the ethics code 0-1 
30. A code of ethics for all company employees 0-1 
31. Policy on “whistle blower” protection for all employees 0-1 
32. Mechanisms protecting the rights of other stakeholders in business 0-1 
33. The role of employees in corporate governance 0-1 
 (v) Board and 
management 
structure and 
process 
34. Governance structures, such as committees and other mechanisms to prevent conflict of 
interest 
0-1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
35. “Checks and balances” mechanisms 0-1 
36. Composition of board of directors (executives and non-executives) 0-1 
37. Composition and function of governance committee structures 0-1 
38. Role and functions of the board of directors 0-1 
39. Risk management objectives, system and activities 0-1 
40. Qualifications and biographical information on board members 0-1 
41. Material interests of members of the board and management 0-1 
42. Existence of plan of succession 0-1 
43. Duration of director's contracts 0-1 
44. Compensation policy for senior executives departing the firm as a result of a merger or 
acquisition 
0-1 
45. Determination and composition of directors` remuneration 0-1 
46. Independence of the board of directors 0-1 
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47. Number of outside board and management position directorships held by the directors 0-1 
48. Existence of procedure(s) for addressing conflicts of interest among board members 0-1 
49. Professional development and training activities 0-1 
50. Availability and use of advisorship facility during reporting period 0-1 
51. Performance evaluation process 0-1 
Total  51 GIND Items  51 
Scoring procedure 
0: If a particular corporate governance item is not disclosed. 
1: If a particular corporate governance item is disclosed. 
 
 
 
 
Table1. Summary of variables and measures  
Dependent variables  
GIND Corporate governance (CG) compliance and disclosure index contains 51 CG provisions using the CG 
benchmark of the United Nations Conference Trade and Development (UNCTAD 2006)'s guidance on good 
practice in CG disclosure, that takes a value of 1 if each of the CG provisions is disclosed, 0 otherwise; scaled 
to a value between 0 and 100%.    
OSH Sub-index of GIND related to ownership structure and exercise of control rights consisting of 9 provisions that 
take a value of 1 if each of the 9 provisions is disclosed 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0 and 100%.      
TCY Sub-index of GIND related to financial transparency consisting of 8 provisions that takes a value of 1 if each of 
the 8 provisions is disclosed 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0 and 100%.      
AUD Sub-index of GIND related to auditing consisting of 9 provisions that takes a value of 1 if each of the 9 
provisions is disclosed 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0 and 100%.      
RTY Sub-index of GIND related to corporate responsibility and compliance consisting of 7 provisions that takes a 
value of 1 if each of the 7 provisions is disclosed 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0 and 100%.      
BMS Sub-index of GIND related to board and management structure and process consisting of 18 provisions that 
takes a value of 1 if each of the 18 provisions is disclosed 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0 and 100%.      
Independent variables  
FIVI 
 
 
 
 
GIEI 
 
 
NGI 
 
 
GDP 
Firm Islamic values index contains 3 provisions (whether a narrative regarding the fact that the firm’s funds and 
loans are on the basis of interest-free is disclosed, whether the firm discloses any Islamic and conventional 
finance separately, and whether a narrative regarding the appropriate calculation and payment of the Islamic 
religious tax “zakah” for the financial year is disclosed) that takes a value of 1 if each of the provisions is 
disclosed, 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0 and 100%. 
Global Islamic economy indicator, developed by Thomson Reuters in collaboration with the Dubai Islamic 
Economy Development Centre, measures the development of the global Islamic economy across its multiple 
sectors (averaged for the period of analysis). 
National Governance Index which is constructed by principal components analysis to combine the six indices 
(Rule of law, government effectiveness, control of corruption, voice and accountability, political stability, and 
regulatory quality). 
Gross domestic product growth (annual %). 
INFL Inflation rate, average consumer prices. 
Control variables 
BRDS 
BDIV 
 
UBL 
 
DSHR 
BSHR 
LNTA 
Natural log of the total number of directors on the board of directors. 
The percentage of the total number of women and ethnic minority (non-Arab) directors to the total number of 
board members. 
A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the roles of chairperson and CEO of firm are combined at the end 
of its financial year, 0 otherwise. 
Percentage of shares held by director.  
Percentage of shares held by shareholders with at least 5% of the total firm shareholdings. 
Natural log of the book value of the total assets of a firm. 
AGE 
SGR 
LV 
ROA 
AFSIZ 
Natural log of the total number of years since a company was established. 
The percentage of current year's sales minus previous year's sales divided by previous year's sales 
The percentage of total debt divided by total assets. 
Percentage of operating profit to total assets at the end of its financial year 
A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm is audited by a Big 4 audit firm (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, and KPMG), 0 otherwise. 
DYER Dummies for the years 2009 to 2014 inclusive. 
DIND 
 
DCOU 
Dummies for each of the eight main industries: basic materials; oil and gas; industrial; customer goods; customer 
services; health care; technology and telecommunication. 
Dummies for each of the five countries 
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Table 2. Summary of descriptive statistics of the GIND, independent and control variables for all sampled firms  
  
Variables Mean Median STD Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: The GIND based on all 600 MENA firms year observations 
GIND % 56.45 56.86 11.59 31.37 84.31 
OSH% 63.31 66.67 11.77 22.22 100.00 
TCY% 74.12 75.00 13.03 37.50 100.00 
AUD% 53.70 55.56 22.24 0 100.00 
RTY% 26.76 14.29 21.59 0 85.71 
BMS% 58.09 61.11 15.58 22.22 88.89 
Panel B: Independent variables 
FIVI% 18.22 0 31.55 0 100.00 
GIEI% 45.64 47.71 13.34 27.15 67.51 
NGI 0 8.98 213.56 -473.28 357.26 
GDP% 3.46 3.30 2.58 -5.20 10.00 
INFL% 179.70 149.43 59.92 110.50 316.99 
Panel C: Control Variables    
BRDS 8.52 9.00 2.59 4.00 19.00 
BDIV% 7.88 0 14.34 0 69.23 
UBL% 21.00 0 40.90 0 100.00 
DSHR% 44.94 47.89 27.90 0 98.92 
BSHR% 55.88 59.49 23.39 5.00 98.92 
LNTA ($m) 2089.75 184.45 5728.52 3.45 35222.66 
AGE 21.84 20.00 10.06 1.00 47.00 
SGR% 9.06 6.01 45.46 -92.59 594.06 
LV% 20.38 17.99 17.65 0 69.75 
ROA% 6.56 6.11 7.76 -32.09 31.03 
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AFSIZ% 59.00 100.00 49.30 0 100.00 
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Table 3. Pearson and Spearman correlation matrices of all variables  
 GIND FIVI GIEI NGI GDP INFL BRDS BDIV UBL DSHR BSHR LNTA AGE SGR LV ROA AFSIZ 
GIND 1 .261*** .694*** .524*** .220*** .053 -0.052 .034 -.501*** -.137*** -.014 .464*** -.124*** .084** .144*** .119*** .420*** 
FIVI .285*** 1 .349*** -.203*** .126*** -.507*** .104** -.188*** -.231*** -.274*** -.265*** .309*** -.171*** .135*** .151*** 0 .146*** 
GIEI .681*** .119*** 1 .697*** .172*** -.076* -.184*** -.210*** -.554*** -.354*** -.137*** .371*** .057 .046 .059 -.026 .242*** 
NGI .553*** -.059 .862*** 1 .202*** .136*** -.271*** -.009 -.443*** -.128*** .057 .028 .089** -.061 -.003 .065 .156*** 
GDP  .117*** .185*** -.044 .020 1 -.253*** -.091** .070* -.152*** -.062 -.018 .010 -.050 -.007 .034 .091** .053 
INFL .024 -.404*** .085** -.171*** -.277*** 1 .083** .077* .121** .255*** .300*** .184*** .206*** .065 -.030 -.025 .109*** 
BRDS -.033 .117*** -.204*** -.276*** -.025 .184*** 1 .054 .243*** .093** -.098** .355*** -.005 .099** .016 .077* .150*** 
BDIV .055 -.190*** -.164*** -.045 .059 -.031 .062 1 .039 .308*** .281*** -.047 -.134*** -.021 .006 .186*** .163*** 
UBL -.500*** -.222*** -.531*** -.479*** -.054 .160*** .249*** -.003 1 .068* -.017 -.196*** .067 .013 -.087** -.012 -.296*** 
DSHR -.155*** -.243*** -.292*** -.215*** -.042 .199*** .107*** .323*** .072* 1 .709*** .125** -.143*** .105*** .078* .255*** .154*** 
BSHR -.007 -.247*** -.054 -.008 -.048 .240*** -.067 .279*** -.018 .710*** 1 .143*** -.113*** .067 .037 .238*** .178*** 
LNTA .454*** .372*** .304*** .050 .010 .245*** .352*** -.029 -.204*** .137*** .169*** 1 -.091** .156*** .298*** .066 .482*** 
AGE -.172*** -.248*** .001 .010 -.043 .184*** -.030 -.101** .117*** -.082** -.070* -.217*** 1 -.081** -.226*** -.077* -.088** 
SGR .079* .135*** .023 -.072* .012 .068* .094** -.013 .012 .113*** .094** .172*** -.121*** 1 .036 .290*** .104** 
LV .141*** .173*** .034 -.010 .028 .004 .026 .028 -.080** .063 .057 .329*** -.282*** .047 1 -.169*** .225*** 
ROA .098** .010 -.018 .043 .055 -.081** .086** .177*** .001 .233*** .258*** .053 -.030 .274*** -.209*** 1 .174*** 
AFSIZ .421*** .201*** .233*** .146*** .016 .098** .135*** .181*** -.296*** .145*** .200*** .482*** -.123*** .110*** .212*** .158*** 1 
 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
N = 600 for all variables. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the .10, .05 and .01 levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
Table 4. Antecedents of corporate governance compliance and disclosure (GIND) 
 
 Dependent variable 
 GIND  GIND  GIND  GIND  GIND 
(Model) (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Independent variables          
FIVI 0.045*** 
(0.006) 
 - 
 
-  -  0.048*** 
(0.003) 
GIEI -  0.342*** 
(0.000) 
 -  -  - 
NGI -  -  0.029*** 
(0.000) 
 -  0.013*** 
(0.000) 
GDP  -  -  -  0.407*** 
(0.000) 
 0.327*** 
(0.004) 
INFL  -  -  -  0.055*** 
(0.000) 
 0.050*** 
(0.000) 
Control Variables          
BRDS 0.008 
(0.473) 
 0.013 
(0.252) 
 
0.011 
(0.359) 
 0.012 
(0.312) 
 0.008 
(0.514) 
BDIV 0.124*** 
(0.000) 
 0.111*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.094*** 
(0.002) 
 0.111*** 
(0.000) 
 0.122*** 
(0.000) 
UBL -0.017* 
(0.059) 
 -0.017* 
(0.058) 
 
-0.026*** 
(0.004) 
 -0.017* 
(0.063) 
 -0.017* 
(0.052) 
DSHR -0.037** 
(0.021) 
 -0.036** 
(0.023) 
 -0.045*** 
(0.005) 
 -0.037** 
(0.019) 
 -0.037** 
(0.020) 
BSHR -0.026 
(0.136) 
 -0.025 
(0.155) 
 
-0.022 
(0.211) 
 -0.022 
(0.204) 
 -0.027 
(0.119) 
LNTA 0.008*** 
(0.002) 
 0.008*** 
(0.002) 
 0.009*** 
(0.001) 
 0.008*** 
(0.001) 
 0.008*** 
(0.002) 
AGE -0.015*** 
(0.007) 
 -0.016*** 
(0.005) 
 
-0.016** 
(0.006) 
 -0.015*** 
(0.007) 
 -0.016*** 
(0.005) 
SGR -0.003 
(0.612) 
 -0.003 
(0.674) 
 
-0.000 
(0.955) 
 -0.003 
(0.660) 
 -0.002 
(0.770) 
LV  0.022 
(0.256) 
 0.025 
(0.192) 
 
0.027 
(0.163) 
 0.021 
(0.260) 
 0.019 
(0.312) 
ROA  0.108*** 
(0.008) 
 0.115*** 
(0.005) 
 
0.103** 
(0.013) 
 0.110*** 
(0.007) 
 0.102** 
(0.012) 
AFSIZ  0.024*** 
(0.000) 
 0.027*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.027*** 
(0.000) 
 0.028*** 
(0.000) 
 0.024*** 
(0.000) 
DYER  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
DIND Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
DCOU  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Constant  0.554***  0.473***  0.608***  0.540***  0.541*** 
D. Watson  2.026  2.087  2.071  2.099  2.083 
F-value 50.05***  51.01***  48.62***  49.66***  48.27*** 
Adjusted R2 69.63%  69.27%  67.68%  69.46%  70.31% 
No. of ob. 600  600  600  600  600 
 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the .10, .05 and .01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. Antecedents of corporate governance compliance and disclosure (sub-indices) 
 
 Dependent variables 
 OSH   TCY  AUD  RTY  BMS 
(Models)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Independent variables         
FIVI 
 
0.034 
(0.161) 
 
0.029 
(0.205) 
 
0.064** 
(0.035) 
 0.219*** 
(0.000) 
 0.069*** 
(0.003) 
NGI  0.004 
(0.448) 
 0.015*** 
(0.001) 
 0.062*** 
(0.000) 
 0.046*** 
(0.000) 
 0.027*** 
(0.000) 
GDP   0.400** 
(0.021) 
 0.111 
(0.492) 
 -0.047 
(0.831) 
 0.490** 
(0.058) 
 0.103 
(0.544) 
INFL   -0.033** 
(0.044) 
 0.032** 
(0.033) 
 -0.001 
(0.975) 
 0.212*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.022 
(0.126) 
Control variables         
BRDS 
 
-0.058*** 
(0.001) 
 
0.030* 
(0.065) 
 
0.035 
(0.127) 
 -0.131*** 
(0.000) 
 0.045** 
(0.011) 
BDIV 
 
-0.021 
(0.628) 
 
0.114*** 
(0.006) 
 
0.129** 
(0.026) 
 0.515*** 
(0.000) 
 0.014 
(0.760) 
UBL 
 
0.015 
(0.255) 
 
0.000 
(0.969) 
 
-0.065*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.008 
(0.680) 
 -0.055*** 
(0.000) 
DSHR  -0.000 
(0.982) 
 -0.017 
(0.434) 
 -0.110*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.046 
(0.196) 
 -0.065*** 
(0.006) 
BSHR 
 
-0.050* 
(0.057) 
 
-0.013 
(0.586) 
 
-0.015 
(0.663) 
 -0.102** 
(0.012) 
 -0.020 
(0.456) 
LNTA  0.026*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.010*** 
(0.004) 
 0.009* 
(0.079) 
 0.020*** 
(0.001) 
 0.007* 
(0.067) 
AGE 
 
-0.016* 
(0.054) 
 
-0.008 
(0.304) 
 
-0.025** 
(0.023) 
 -0.005 
(0.694) 
 -0.020** 
(0.019) 
SGR 
 
-0.001 
(0.875) 
 
-0.001 
(0.884) 
 
-0.004 
(0.731) 
 0.006 
(0.683) 
 0.002 
(0.853) 
LV  
 
0.018 
(0.522) 
 
0.051* 
(0.055) 
 
0.070* 
(0.060) 
 -0.030 
(0.487) 
 0.004 
(0.900) 
ROA  
 
0.068 
(0.267) 
 
0.116** 
(0.043) 
 
-0.014 
(0.862) 
 0.202** 
(0.031) 
 0.119* 
(0.061) 
AFSIZ  
 
-0.001 
(0.930) 
 
0.039*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.023* 
(0.088) 
 0.077*** 
(0.000) 
 0.003 
(0.731) 
DYER   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
DIND  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
DCOU   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Constant   0.532***  0.794***  0.614***  -0.049  0.673*** 
D. Watson   1.714  2.058  1.749  2.324  1.799 
F-value  11.41***  23.61***  45.87***  25.08***  33.75*** 
Adjusted R2  34.26%  53.10%  68.48%  53.83%  61.32% 
No. of ob.  600  600  600  600  600 
 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the .10, .05 and .01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 6. Sensitivity analyses of the antecedents of corporate governance compliance and disclosure (GIND) 
 
 GIND  W-GIND  Lagged-Effects  Fixed –Effect  Small-Size  Large-Size 
(Model) (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Independent variables            
FIVI 0.047*** 
(0.003) 
 
0.061*** 
(0.000) 
 0.049*** 
(0.005) 
 0.013*** 
(0.006) 
 0.009 
(0.602) 
 0.110*** 
(0.000) 
NGI -  0.018*** 
(0.000) 
 0.009* 
(0.059) 
 0.034*** 
(0.000) 
 0.003 
(0.455) 
 0.015*** 
(0.000) 
AVNGI 0.280*** 
(0.000) 
 -  -  -  -  - 
GDP  -  0.322*** 
(0.004) 
 0.259** 
(0.030) 
 0.322*** 
(0.000) 
 0.407*** 
(0.004) 
 0.271* 
(0.076) 
LNGDP 0.028*** 
(0.000) 
 -  -  -  -  - 
INFL  0.040*** 
(0.000) 
 0.060*** 
(0.000) 
 0.065*** 
(0.000) 
 0.127*** 
(0.000) 
 0.015 
(0.255) 
 0.078*** 
(0.000) 
Control Variables            
BRDS 0.009 
(0.463) 
 
-0.009 
(0.445) 
 0.010 
(0.443) 
 -0.069 
(0.782) 
 0.014 
(0.296) 
 -0.047*** 
(0.007) 
BDIV 0.123*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.157*** 
(0.000) 
 0.124*** 
(0.000) 
 0.012*** 
(0.001) 
 0.019 
(0.611) 
 0.147*** 
(0.001) 
UBL -0.017* 
(0.058) 
 
-0.013 
(0.128) 
 -0.008 
(0.419) 
 -0.029*** 
(0.001) 
 0.003 
(0.725) 
 -0.069*** 
(0.000) 
DSHR -0.036** 
(0.021) 
 -0.036** 
(0.019) 
 -0.050*** 
(0.004) 
 -0.008 
(0.719) 
 0.042** 
(0.037) 
 -0.059*** 
(0.003) 
BSHR -0.027 
(0.129) 
 
-0.032* 
(0.061) 
 -0.014 
(0.470) 
 -0.040* 
(0.084) 
 -0.036* 
(0.082) 
 -0.021 
(0.373) 
LNTA 0.008*** 
(0.002) 
 0.009*** 
(0.000) 
 0.007** 
(0.012) 
 0.003*** 
(0.000) 
 0.008** 
(0.049) 
 -0.007* 
(0.091) 
AGE -0.016*** 
(0.005) 
 
-0.014*** 
(0.009) 
 -0.015*** 
(0.009) 
 -0.002** 
(0.013) 
 -0.009** 
(0.014) 
 0.001 
(0.846) 
SGR -0.002 
(0.732) 
 
-0.001 
(0.815) 
 -0.000 
(0.951) 
 0.002 
(0.608) 
 -0.004 
(0.572) 
 -0.005 
(0.543) 
LV  0.021 
(0.257) 
 
0.021 
(0.251) 
 0.011 
(0.577) 
 0.009 
(0.665) 
 0.005 
(0.806) 
 0.048* 
(0.067) 
ROA  0.105*** 
(0.010) 
 
0.102** 
(0.011) 
 0.076* 
(0.085) 
 0.017 
(0.614) 
 0.009 
(0.836) 
 0.192*** 
(0.002) 
AFSIZ 0.024*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.030*** 
(0.000) 
 0.025*** 
(0.001) 
 0.013** 
(0.018) 
 -0.020*** 
(0.004) 
 0.083*** 
(0.000) 
DYER Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
DIND Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
DCOU  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Constant  0.321***  0.509***  0.499***  0.447***  0.426***  0.727*** 
D. Watson  2.051  2.148  2.139  1.829  2.036  1.820 
F-value 49.16***  46.38***  42.92***  91.38***  33.13***  30.78*** 
Adjusted R2 69.98%  69.44%  70.90%  94.72%  75.71%  74.92% 
No. of ob. 600  600  600  600  600  600 
Variable definitions: AVNGI = an average of the six national governance qualities, LNGDP = the natural logarithm of GDP (in US$) as per the World Bank, 
See Table 1 for other variable definitions. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the .10, .05 and .01 levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
